Write by Naade Ali
Naade Ali is an International Relations Researcher with over 6 years of experience, specializing in the Middle East and South Asia regions. He provides expert insights to international think tanks, strategic advisory firms, and regularly contributes analysis to leading global publications and media outlets.
Over the past year, Pakistan’s terrorism landscape has undergone significant evolution and diversification. The surge in terror-related fatalities has made 2024 the deadliest year for Pakistan, with total deaths in the first three quarters surpassing the figures for all of 2023. According to available data, at least 1,534 fatalities were recorded from January to September 2024, compared to 1,523 in the entirety of the previous year. The third quarter (July-September) alone witnessed a 90% increase in terrorist violence compared to earlier periods, with 722 deaths—including civilians, security personnel, and 615 injuries reported across 328 incidents.
During the first ten months of 2024, Pakistan experienced 785 militant attacks, resulting in 951 deaths and 966 injuries. October emerged as the second deadliest month of the year, following August. Notably, 97% of terrorism-related fatalities occurred in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which remain strongholds for terrorist groups. This persistent insecurity has exacerbated economic, social, and political instability in the country. Since 9/11, terrorism has claimed over 80,000 lives in Pakistan and inflicted an economic loss exceeding $150 billion, alongside widespread destruction of infrastructure.
The drivers of terrorism include religious extremism, sub-nationalism, the shadow economy (involving narcotics, extortion, and smuggling), the crime-terror nexus, and disinformation campaigns targeting state institutions. The country currently faces the largest jihadi front, with at least 16 well-trained and heavily armed terrorist organizations, including Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan, Al-Qaeda, ISKP, Jaish ul-Adl, Jamaat Ansarullah, Balochistan Liberation Army, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, among others.
The TTP, in particular, has emerged as the most violent and resurgent group. Since 2023, it has expanded its administrative chapters to 12 Wilayahs across Pakistan’s five provinces, each led by a shadow governor. The terror group has absorbed 63 militant factions, growing its strength to an estimated 6,000–6,500 fighters, according to a UN Security Council report. In October alone, the TTP claimed responsibility for 220 attacks, resulting in 184 casualties among security personnel. Its leadership has declared Pakistan the world’s largest jihadi front and vowed to continue their campaign until a complete Sharia-based system is established.
The TTP has demonstrated its ability to launch operations across Pakistan and has established training centers, bases, and resources within the country. Pakistani military chief General Asim Munir has described the TTP as a hub for global terror groups and proxies, underscoring the severity of the threat it poses to national and regional security.
The second most lethal terrorist organization in Pakistan is the secular nationalist Baloch militant group, which seeks full independence from the country. Despite being politically and ideologically distinct from extremist jihadists, reports indicate high-level collaboration between the two, including operational support, weapons trading, logistical aid, intelligence sharing, and even coordinated attacks against Pakistani security forces and law enforcement agencies. Recent expressions of mutual support between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch militants on their media platforms suggest a narrowing divide between secular nationalism and religious extremism.
The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has long waged a low-intensity separatist insurgency in Balochistan but has recently enhanced its operational capacity, conducting large-scale, synchronized attacks on high-value targets. These include billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, Chinese workers in Pakistan, security forces, and civilians, contributing to escalating violence and insecurity in the region. The BLA has adopted more lethal tactics often associated with Islamist militant groups, such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and complex attacks involving multiple attackers and vehicle-borne IEDs.
A notable component of the BLA’s strategy is the Majeed Brigade, its suicide squad, which includes a significant number of women and is believed to have carried out most of the group’s sophisticated attacks. While the exact size of the BLA remains unknown, it is estimated to include over 6,000 highly trained guerrilla fighters. One of its deadliest operations this year, codenamed “Operation Herof ” involved approximately 800 fighters and seven suicide bombers. This attack, targeting Pakistan’s security forces in August, saw the BLA seize control of key roads and strategic locations of Balochistan for 20 hours, effectively challenging the state’s writ.
The BLA poses a greater threat to Pakistan than the TTP due to its ability to recruit educated Baloch youth, including women, in a province where 65% of the population of 15 million is under 30. Longstanding grievances among the Baloch, such as poverty, deprivation, alleged extrajudicial abuses, and political suppression, have created fertile ground for recruitment. Many BLA leaders and fighters are former professionals and university students, framing their armed struggle as a liberation movement for Balochistan’s independence. The group’s propaganda emphasizes self-sacrifice for a broader political cause, portraying its fight as a legitimate resistance to exploitation, particularly in the context of CPEC projects.
The terrorism landscape has evolved to include not only militant insurgency but also widespread political dissent. This dissent, expressed through popular uprisings and mob attacks, and further fueled by a narrative war and hostile digital campaigns against the civil-military regime, has created a battleground of escalating tensions between politically-driven masses and state institutions. A pivotal moment occurred last year on May 9, when violent protesters allegedly from the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party vandalized and set fire to multiple government and military installations. The government accused the political party of inciting rebellion and civil war by turning citizens against the military.
This description aptly captures Pakistan’s current predicament as it faces a dual threat: traditional militant insurgency and a new form of ideological warfare conducted through digital platforms. Together, these challenges threaten both national cohesion and security. Militant groups, including religious extremists and ethno-nationalist separatists, remain a serious threat, particularly in conflict-prone regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. At the same time, dissenting voices critical of the civil-military leadership are leveraging digital platforms to disseminate anti-state narratives and disinformation. The military has classified these actors as “digital terrorists,” accusing them of undermining public trust, fueling anarchy, and complicating counterterrorism efforts.
The current civil-military regime’s response to these threats has faced sharp criticism, with political dissenters accusing it of authoritarianism and fundamental human rights violations under the guise of counterterrorism policies and operations. Such allegations have deepened public grievances, further weakening trust in state institutions. The military maintains that the damage inflicted by narrative manipulation on digital platforms can rival or even exceed that of physical attacks, emphasizing the urgency of redefining counterterrorism strategies.
Pakistan’s changing counterterrorism policies
The evolving terrorism landscape has compelled the current civil-military administration to reevaluate its strategies, moving beyond traditional kinetic counterterrorism operations to incorporate preventive, non-kinetic measures aimed at addressing the root causes of terrorism. The newly adopted counterterrorism policy, rooted in the security-development-political stability nexus, reflects lessons drawn from the failures of previous strategies.
Pakistan has developed multiple comprehensive policies over the years to combat terrorism, each reflecting a collective national resolve. These include the revised 14-point National Action Plan (NAP) of 2021, the National Internal Security Policies (NISP) of 2013-2018 and 2018-2023, and the National Security Policy (NSP) 2022-2026. Among these, the National Action Plan remains the cornerstone of Pakistan’s counterterrorism framework.
Initially formulated in 2014 as a 20-point agenda, the NAP was revised in 2021 and streamlined into 14 points, dividing responsibilities between the civil and military leadership into kinetic and non-kinetic components. Kinetic measures included military operations against terrorist groups, curbing cyberterrorism, prosecuting extremists, choking terror financing, and dismantling terror-crime networks. Non-kinetic measures focused on legislative reforms, intelligence gathering, regulating religious seminaries, enhancing law enforcement capabilities, fostering community reconciliation in volatile regions, and repatriating illegal Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan.
The NAP outlined a four-phase counterterrorism strategy: Clear, Hold, Transfer, and Build. The military was tasked with clearing territories of terrorists and maintaining security (“clear and hold”), while civilian administrations were to assume control and focus on governance and development (“transfer and build”). While the military claims to have cleared 46,000 sq. km of territory from terrorists, it attributes the resurgence of militant activity to the civilian administration’s failure to deliver effective governance in these areas.
Similarly, the National Internal Security Policies (NISP) were built on the foundations of the NAP. The first NISP (2013-2018) emphasized dialogue with stakeholders, isolating terrorists from their support bases, and enhancing deterrence through capacity-building of security forces. It adopted a dual approach—soft and hard—implemented through the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). The second NISP (2018-2023) expanded its focus to include administrative reforms, challenging extremist narratives, and addressing socio-economic grievances. Despite ambitious goals, these policies remained largely unimplemented due to coordination gaps, limited capacity-building, and a failure to address ideological and socio-economic root causes of terrorism.
The persistence of conventional terrorist groups is attributed to several factors: the mass resettlement of militants from Afghanistan after the Taliban’s return to power, entrenched networks in urban areas (often involving undocumented foreign residents), and access to advanced weaponry left behind by U.S. forces. Furthermore, an illicit economy—fueled by drug trafficking, extortion, and misuse of charity funds—sustains these groups. Deep-rooted ideological divides and grievances against the military, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, further complicate counterterrorism efforts.
Shifting Focus to Non-Kinetic Measures
Recognizing the limitations of past strategies, the military under Army Chief Gen. Munir has expanded its focus beyond kinetic operations to include economic governance and non-kinetic measures as part of its counterterrorism campaign. Last year, the government enacted significant legislative amendments, including changes to the Army Act, granting the military greater authority to participate in national development and strategic activities. Other legislation, such as the Official Secrets Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, enhanced the military’s jurisdiction and curtailed criticism of the armed forces. The establishment of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) further empowered the military to play a pivotal role in economic decision-making.
In security policy, Gen. Munir has adopted a more confrontational stance toward the Afghan Taliban, accusing Kabul of harboring anti-Pakistan militants. His policy includes the ongoing deportation of 1.7 million Afghan refugees, which he claims is critical for enhancing internal security. These measures mark a significant departure from Pakistan’s traditionally cooperative ties with the Afghan Taliban.
A Revised Counterterrorism Vision
Building on last year’s developments, the civil-military leadership unveiled a new counterterrorism vision this year, Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), aimed at revitalizing efforts to combat terrorism. Announced on June 23 by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, this initiative integrates kinetic military actions with non-kinetic measures, involving all branches of the state. It adopts a “no mercy, no dialogue” policy toward terrorists, abandoning previous approaches that allowed groups to regroup and prolong the conflict. The government has allocated PKR 60 billion ($218 million) to Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, making it one of the costliest initiatives to date.
The rationale behind this initiative lies in the growing threats posed by conventional terrorism and ideological warfare through digital platforms. Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts now focus on a holistic strategy that tackles the root causes of extremism, improves governance, and bolsters the security apparatus to ensure national stability. As a national vision rooted in the 14-point revised National Action Plan of 2021, it employs a comprehensive approach aimed at:
- Combating terrorism through continued spates of small-scale, targeted “intelligence-based operations.”
- Enhancing border security to prevent the cross-border movement of terrorists and expedite the repatriation of illegal immigrants perceived as abettors of terrorism.
- Fostering political stability and reconciliation through national consensus to mitigate political polarization, which provides fertile ground for terrorism and extremism.
- Ensuring good governance by tackling corruption, money laundering, and terrorism financing.
- Implementing effective legislation to empower security agencies for the swift prosecution of designated terrorists.
- Promoting socio-economic development to disrupt the link between deprivation and terrorism.
- Increasing regional and international support through enhanced diplomatic efforts.
Although recently named Azm-e-Istehkam, this major counterterrorism effort originated in April 2023 when Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s previous government announced an “all-out comprehensive operation” to combat militancy. Political and economic constraints, however, prevented the civil-military leadership from fully implementing the operation. Following the formation of a new government after the February 8 elections this year, along with the approval of another IMF bailout package and renewed support from the US and China for counterterrorism, the current civil-military leadership deemed it the right time to announce the new vision. This vision seeks to reinvigorate and reenergize Pakistan’s ongoing counterterrorism campaign, symbolizing a national resolve to eliminate terrorism and extremism amidst escalating political, security, and economic crisis that continues to hinder the effectiveness of the counterterrorism efforts.
Azm-e-Istekham’s broad multi-domain and multi-agency approach marks a significant shift in Pakistan’s security strategy, recognizing that past policies of accommodating extremists through unsuccessful peace dialogues and supporting the Afghan Taliban’s return to power have proven detrimental. What sets this new vision apart is its synchronization of counterterrorism policies with politics. For the first time, the military announced that, in addition to small-scale operations targeting traditional terrorist groups, it would also take action against political dissenters especially those labeled as “digital terrorists” for spreading anti-military sentiments on social media.
Political resistance to the initiative
The Azm-e-Istehkam initiative has sharply divided political opinion, drawing a clear line between those who support the military and those critical of its actions. Since its announcement, the initiative has faced significant opposition from political factions who view it as another attempt to consolidate military power at the expense of democracy. Critics argue that such measures could destabilize Pakistan further, exacerbating vulnerabilities instead of enhancing national security.
Prominent political parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Jamiat Ulema Islam Fazal (JUI-F), Awami National Party (ANP), Jamaat-e-Islami, Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), National Democratic Movement (NDM), and other religious, ethnic, and right-wing groups with strongholds in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan—regions central to the offensive—have voiced strong opposition. Their stance is reinforced by public mistrust, stemming from the counterproductive outcomes of previous military operations in these provinces.
Unlike in the past, the military now faces a lack of both political and public support, restricting it to smaller, intelligence-based targeted operations rather than large-scale offensives. This limitation hampers its ability to effectively counter the escalating terrorism threat. Furthermore, allegations of electoral interference, political engineering, and suppression of dissent by the military have deepened public skepticism about the motives and legitimacy of Azm-e-Istehkam.
The military’s attempts to build public and political consensus around the operation have not achieved the success seen in previous campaigns. Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir has repeatedly called for national unity, urging stakeholders to set aside divisive politics and prioritize the country’s interests over personal agendas. Despite these appeals, the dominant narrative disseminated by anti-military political factions suggest that Azm-e-Istehkam risks transforming Pakistan into a hyper-security state, using coercive anti-terrorism measures to suppress political dissent and criminalize opposition. While the military has dismissed these claims as baseless and anti-state propaganda, they underscore a widening trust gap between the institution and significant sections of the population.
The incumbent government faces the challenging task of building political consensus for the newly adopted counterterrorism approach amid a deeply polarized political climate. To address criticism, it has presented Azm-e-Istehkam as a vital initiative for establishing lasting peace and stability, paving the way for socioeconomic progress. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has reassured the public that, unlike past operations such as Al-Mizan, Zarb-e-Azb, and Rad-ul-Fasaad, this campaign will avoid civilian displacement and minimize disruptions to everyday life. Emphasizing the importance of unity, PM Shehbaz has called for a “unified political voice and a cohesive national narrative” as essential elements to reinvigorate the counterterrorism effort under the Azm-e-Istehkam framework.
One of the primary goals of the Azm-e-Istekham initiative is to redefine Pakistan’s national ideology in response to extremist and populist political narratives. The military has taken the lead in shaping this national discourse, with the army chief incorporating both religious and national elements into the vision. The religious aspect aims to counter radical jihadi ideologies, while the national component seeks to address political polarization, sub-nationalism, and separatism.
Under this initiative, the army chief has emphasized the Islamization of Pakistan’s ideology, positioning it as central to the nation’s identity. Known for his conservative religious beliefs and as a Hafiz-e-Quran (one who has memorized the Quran), Gen. Munir frequently uses religious references in his speeches, drawing parallels from Islamic scripture and history to reinforce his leadership. He has portrayed Pakistan’s military as agents of God engaged in a righteous struggle, with victory assured by divine will.
In his Independence Day address, Gen. Munir underscored his vision of Pakistan’s national ideology, reaffirming its founding as an Islamic state to protect Muslim identity. He rejected Western ideals as incompatible with Pakistan’s values and justified the military’s role as the guardian of both the state and Islam. He argued that the stability and progress of Pakistan were directly tied to the strength of its military, warning that weakening the armed forces would undermine the state itself.
Gen. Munir has also identified two main internal threats: “digital terrorists,” referring to those who use social media to defame or conspire against the military, and violent extremist groups, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which he labels Fitna al-Khawarij (rebellious forces). He condemned both groups for violating the constitution and misusing freedom of speech for anti-state activities. In his view, these extremist actions are un-Islamic and contrary to shari’a. Gen. Munir has made it clear that the Azm-e-Istekham vision is the only path forward to combat terrorism and political division, warning that those opposing this vision are enemies of both God and Pakistan and will face swift military retaliation.
Political aims of the initiative
Azm-e-Istehkam carries substantial political implications beyond its counterterrorism objectives. While addressing the threat of terrorism is its primary focus, the initiative also seeks to fortify the civil-military regime’s hold on power. It represents a more stringent effort to pressure the opposition into compliance, using the pretext of national security to stabilize the political landscape and ensure uninterrupted governance. By framing counterterrorism as a unifying cause, the government aims to bridge political divides and compel opposition parties to support military operations, as dissent could risk them being labeled as pro-terrorism. This approach effectively limits the opposition’s political maneuverability. Through Azm-e-Istehkam, the government seeks to achieve three key goals: preventing political dissent, legitimizing its policies, and consolidating its authority.
To achieve its objectives, the government has introduced a legislative aspect to Azm-e-Istehkam, facilitating the passage of laws that enhance the authority of state security agencies while limiting civilian oversight. Recently, both the National Assembly and Senate approved the Pakistan Army Act Amendment, 2024, which extends the tenure of the service chiefs (Army, Navy, and Air Force) to a maximum of five years. The amendment also exempts the service chiefs from standard retirement age and service limits during their tenure, including reappointment or extension. As a result of this change, Army Chief Gen. Munir, who was originally set to retire next year, will now remain in his position for an additional two years, allowing him sufficient time to fully implement his policies.
Security aims of the initiative
From a security standpoint, Azm-e-Istekham aims to consolidate the ongoing small-scale intelligence-based operations—more than 130 conducted daily—under a unified strategy. These operations are carried out jointly by the military and provincial Counterterrorism Departments (CTDs) to disrupt terrorist networks, targeting hoarders, drug traffickers, illegal arms suppliers, and engaging in initiatives such as installing CCTV cameras in major cities through safe city projects to improve surveillance and modern policing.
According to the latest military data, 32,173 intelligence-based operations were conducted in the first eight months of this year. However, the deteriorating terrorism situation in Pakistan has worsened in response to Azm-e-Istekham, with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launching a counteroffensive called “Azm-e-Shariat,” intended to escalate attacks. The Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction of the TTP has also initiated “Al-Fatah bi al-Nusratul Rehman” (Victory by God’s Help), targeting security forces in North Waziristan, while the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar faction declared “Al Ra’ad” (Thunder), inspired by a Quranic surah calling for severe punishment against infidels. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has similarly ramped up militant activity in retaliation to Azm-e-Istekham.
In light of these developments, Azm-e-Istekham, initially focused on small-scale intelligence-based kinetic operations, has evolved into a large-scale military campaign. The earlier efforts alone have proven insufficient in mitigating the surge in terror attacks. Recently, the government formally announced a comprehensive military operation against terrorist organizations operating in Balochistan. Neither the PM Sharif’s office nor the military divulge details about the operation, or say whether it will include ground or air strikes, or whether parts of it will be conducted in cooperation with China or Iran.
Socio-Economic aspect of the initiative
The severe deprivation in KPK and Balochistan has fostered an environment ripe for militancy. To address this, Azm-e-Istekham places the marginalized and impoverished communities of Pakistan at the forefront of socioeconomic development. Over the year, Gen. Munir launched several initiatives focusing on Balochistan and KPK. As part of the strategy to dismantle the breeding grounds of extremism, the Pakistan army initiated an educational drive to counter the madrasa (religious seminary) culture in these regions. In the newly merged districts of KPK and remote areas of Balochistan, the army leads an “Education for All” campaign, establishing primary schools with army personnel serving as teachers and providing stipends to students as encouragement. For madrasa students, vocational training programs have been introduced to help them enter the competitive job market.
As part of its socioeconomic uplift drive, the army is also investing in healthcare, energy, mining, agriculture, and key infrastructure projects. With Balochistan’s vast untapped natural resources, the army chief has promised that the people of Balochistan will benefit from army-supported development, stating, “The success of Balochistan is the success of Pakistan.” Through the Green Pakistan Initiative, the army is assisting local farmers in Balochistan and KPK in cultivating barren lands with commercially valuable crops and trees to ensure food security and sustain ecosystems. Under the Special Investment Facility Council, the army chief has vowed to transform KPK and Balochistan into prime destinations for foreign investment. These ongoing socioeconomic initiatives will be further expanded under the Azm-e-Istekham vision.
While Azm-e-Istekham may help the ruling civil-military regime build some support base in Balochistan and KPK, it is unlikely to bridge the gap between the local populace and the regime. This is primarily because Azm-e-Istekham does not address the longstanding structural grievances of the Baloch and Pashtuns regarding the issue of missing persons and lacks mechanisms for holding law enforcement agencies accountable for extrajudicial killings. Given the significance of revenge and retribution in Baloch and Pashtun culture, militancy against the Pakistani armed forces is likely to continue until these grievances are addressed.
Equally, a growing trend of online dissent on social media has become a major challenge for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. Concerns have been raised by the army chief regarding the prevalence of anti-military content online. The government has attempted to address this by limiting public access to certain social media platforms. Therefore, the Azm-e-Istekham initiative also appears to be a countermeasure, aiming to shape a pro-military online narrative by engaging social media influencers and implementing social media monitoring mechanisms to counter opponents.
Diplomatic aspect of the initiative
Another fundamental element of the Azm-e-Istekham vision involves bolstering Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts through diplomatic channels, seeking international acknowledgment of its threat perception and validation of its military actions. Recent diplomatic engagements at both multilateral and regional forums illustrate Pakistan’s commitment to this vision, advocating for increased collaboration, cooperation, and clear communication among members of the international community concerning threats to its national security. By portraying the TTP-Afghan Taliban alliance as a global menace akin to Daesh and Al-Qaeda, Pakistan is building a significant international case to delegitimize the Afghan Taliban for supporting the TTP, while justifying its strikes within Afghan territory and the forced expulsion of Afghan refugees.
These diplomatic measures communicate Pakistan’s intentions to deter the Afghan Taliban from supporting the TTP, making it clear that they understand the severe consequences of noncompliance. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Pakistan has sought UN pressure on the Afghan Taliban to control the TTP and its affiliates, prevent cross-border attacks against Pakistan, disarm TTP terrorists, and hand over TTP leaders to Pakistan. By focusing international attention on the Afghan Taliban’s support for terrorist groups, Pakistan also aims to divert scrutiny from the UN over its expulsion of illegal Afghan migrants, which has been heavily criticized for potentially triggering a humanitarian crisis.
Regionally, Pakistan is actively pursuing a diplomatic strategy through involvement in key platforms such as the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan mechanism, the Moscow format of consultations on Afghanistan, the regional Quartet of Russia-China-Iran-Pakistan, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Employing a diplomatic strategy that includes comprehensive defensive and offensive measures, Pakistan aims to establish substantial barriers against terrorists, their infrastructure, support networks, financial flows, and other resources in the long term. This diplomatic interpretation of Azm-e-Istekham was apparent at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, where Pakistan advocated for an urgent ‘concerted campaign’ to combat the TTP, stressing the shared responsibility of regional states in counterterrorism efforts. The primary objective of the diplomatic aspect of Azm-e-Istekham is to transform Pakistan’s image from that of a state sponsor of terrorism to a recognized victim of terrorism.
Impact of the initiative on Pakistan-Afghan Taliban relations
The newly implemented Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan under Azm-e-Istekham poses a serious risk to bilateral relations between the two countries. Since the initiative’s inception, cross-border skirmishes have become a regular occurrence, reflecting a deepening distrust that may escalate into a broader conflict, further destabilizing an already volatile region. At the heart of the rising tensions lies Pakistan’s accusation that the Afghan Taliban regime harbors the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Additionally, Pakistan alleges that a significant number of the 1.7 million undocumented Afghan refugees residing within its borders have been involved in criminal and terrorist activities. In response, Pakistan has accelerated the forced expulsion of Afghan refugees as part of its counterterrorism measures, exacerbating tensions and triggering a humanitarian crisis. Under Azm-e-Istekham, Pakistan has carried out several surgical strikes within Afghan territory, targeting key TTP commanders, and has warned the Afghan interim government of further operations unless it ceases support for the TTP. In retaliation, the Afghan Taliban have issued threats of their own, raising the ominous prospect of full-scale hostilities and a resurgence of violence along the Afghan-Pakistan border.
Impact of the initiative on China-Pakistan relations
The launch of Azm-e-Istekham is widely viewed as Pakistan’s final attempt to address China’s growing security concerns over its 29,000 citizens in Pakistan, including 2,500 involved in the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Repeated terrorist attacks targeting Chinese personnel and infrastructure have strained Beijing’s trust in Pakistan’s ability to ensure security, particularly in the politically unstable and violence-prone regions of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which host over half of the CPEC projects.
China has stressed that a stable security environment is essential for its future investments and has urged Pakistan to adopt its Global Security Initiative, which includes bolstering counter-terrorism measures, tightening border controls, and combating arms and drug trafficking. Recently, Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong criticized Pakistan’s handling of security threats, calling the violence “unacceptable” and a barrier to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. Pakistan initially dismissed these remarks but later signaled agreement to align development with security measures during discussions between Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Ambassador Jiang.
Beijing is pursuing joint security measures with Pakistan, potentially involving Chinese personnel in sensitive areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where frequent attacks by Baloch separatists threaten Chinese interests. Discussions are underway to establish joint security companies, allowing Chinese security forces to operate in Pakistan, a move Islamabad has previously resisted. Currently, Pakistan deploys over 10,000 soldiers, including two dedicated infantry divisions, to safeguard Chinese investments, but recent attacks have prompted Beijing to push for eased restrictions on Chinese private security companies.
Under a proposed model, Chinese personnel would manage internal security while Pakistani forces oversee external protection. There is speculation that China has requested a military base at Gwadar Port, although Pakistan’s Foreign Office denies this. Regardless, China has tied future investments to Pakistan’s improved security measures and increased counter-terrorism cooperation. In response, Islamabad allocated an additional PKR 45 billion ($162 million) for defense, marking its second major security expenditure this year.
China’s evolving security role and interest in Pakistan is evident as it prepares to participate in Pakistan-hosted Warrior-VIII joint counterterrorism exercises, the first in five years, involving its Western Theater Command. This shift reflects Beijing’s growing emphasis on security under its Global Security Initiative. Meanwhile, Pakistan has shared fresh evidence with China of the Afghan Taliban’s inaction against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), urging a unified stance to pressure Kabul into meeting its counter-terrorism commitments.
As China transitions from economic engagement to a security-focused strategy, it may push for an expanded operational role in Pakistan. While this could enhance counter-terrorism efforts and border security through advanced technology and intelligence sharing, it risks undermining the Pakistani military’s position as the primary security guarantor. Ultimately, Azm-e-Istekham represents Pakistan’s most compelling initiative to reassure China and stabilize their strategic partnership.
Impact of the initiative on Pakistan-US relations
The Azm-e-Istekham initiative leverages the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan in combating extremism and terrorism. For Pakistan, this vision represents a significant advancement in counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S., while for the U.S., it provides an opportunity to play a pivotal role in enhancing Pakistan’s internal security. The outgoing Biden Administration demonstrated its support for this initiative by expressing a commitment to establishing high-level counterterrorism dialogues, funding capacity-building programs, and facilitating U.S.-Pakistan military engagements.
Pakistan outlining Azm-e-Istekham as a three-pronged strategy comprising doctrinal, societal, and operational components earlier conveyed to the U.S. that the first two phases were already completed, with the operational phase pending the delivery of advanced small arms and communication equipment from the U.S. Following the renewal of the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) last year, the Biden Administration was expected to provide a military aid package to strengthen Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. This expectation was reinforced by President Biden’s letter to Prime Minister Shehbaz in March, where he expressed Washington’s interest in revitalizing its partnership with Islamabad to address critical regional and global challenges. In the wake of a recent surge in terrorism, the U.S. has once again reiterated its commitment to supporting Pakistan’s government and institutions under the Azm-e-Istekham initiative. However, with the return of the Trump Administration, Pakistan is concerned that its relationship with the U.S. could revert to being transactional. Based on Trump’s previous approach, there is apprehension that he might choose to disengage from Pakistan, prioritizing limited security cooperation.
Chances of success of the initiative
At first glance, Azm-e-Istekham seems to be a well-intentioned initiative. However, its effectiveness is diminished by Pakistan’s complex crises. The current ruling civil-military regime, marred by a controversial history, lacks the public and political trust needed to fully implement an offensive strategy. To gain this crucial support, the regime would need to make concessions. Unfortunately, this appears unlikely. Compounding the issue is the regime’s reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue with its critics. Neither the Shehbaz Sharif-led government nor the military establishment seems willing to make concessions to the political opposition. This deadlock between the regime and its opponents creates an atmosphere of suspicion and hinders the formation of a broad national consensus, which is essential for a successful counterterrorism strategy. Public support is vital for effective information gathering, intelligence sharing, and fostering community-based initiatives to combat extremist ideologies. Without such consensus, Azm-e-Istekham risks becoming another top-down approach, disconnected from the realities on the ground and ultimately destined for limited impact.
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